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Artification and the Aesthetic Regime of Art
  Aleš Erjavec 
Abstract
The author discusses “artification” and attempts to ascertain
whether some common features can be found between
artification and Jacques Rancière’s aesthetics, especially his
notion of the “aesthetic regime of art.”  The author argues that
Rancière’s project of “art become life” can be employed as a
common denominator of both theoretical frameworks, that of
artification and that of the aesthetic regime of art. 
Nonetheless, the art to which Rancière’s notion primarily
applies is different from art in the traditional sense, which
seems to form the empirical basis of the notion of artification.
Key Words
aesthetic regime of art, “art become life,” artification, art-like,
play
1.  Introduction
This article is divided into three parts.  I first discuss
“artification” and some issues arising from and around this
term, and then present Jacques Rancière’s notion of the
“aesthetic regime of art” and some related themes.  Finally, I
bring together artification and the aesthetic regime of art in
order to ascertain whether we can find some common
conceptual and theoretical terrain, or at least some
compatibility, between them or only dissimilarity and
incompatibility.  In this closing part, I also discuss whether the
two notions, in spite of what appear to be insurmountable
differences, are, or could be, of significance to each other and
to the theoretical framework supporting each of them, or that
they arise from completely different theoretical and even
practical positions, suppositions, and dispositions, and
therefore do not have anything in common.
Before I dwell on these issues, let me explain that my frame
of reference will be both recent (modernist) and contemporary
art, the main feature of which appears to be indeterminacy of
its expressive, creative, institutional, and aesthetic attributes. 
At the same time, this is also art that, in its post-colonial
instances, is a formation and creation of nineteenth-century
European culture and its emerging social and cultural
institutions.  The two pivotal but opposed philosophical authors
articulating this strand of thought on art and its philosophical
reflection are, of course, Kant and Hegel.  Contemporary art
furthermore encompasses non-European art.  An unlikely
aesthetic source, André Malraux, observed in 1957 that
around 1900 Europeans ceased to regard “primitive” artifacts
as ethnographic curiosities and began to look at them as “art”:
The metamorphosis of the past was first a
metamorphosis of seeing.  Without an aesthetic
revolution, the sculpture of ancient epochs, mosaics,
and stained glass windows would never have joined the
painting of the Renaissance and the great monarchies;
no matter how vast they might have become,
ethnographic collections would never have surmounted
the barrier that separated them from art museums.[1]
This signifies that since at least a century ago, Western art,
together with its indigenous and non-Western similes, has
been preparing the stage for the current situation, where all
forms and instances of art coexist within a myriad of art
worlds.  These art worlds themselves exist and coexist in a
temporal and cultural flux in which only the general term ‘art’
retains its permanence.  Today, once a work is designated as
art, it hardly ever loses this designation.  This then means that
an enormous, universally acclaimed although perhaps also
ignored archive of past art exists in various art and culture
institutions.  At the same time, contemporary and recent art
exists in our perception as “art,” but is devoid of the same
artistic permanence that traditional (representational) art has
enjoyed.  In contemporary art, it is increasingly the “process,”
or the “event” of the artistic act, including its contextual
placement, that makes a work into a work of art.  In
contemporary art, modern and contemporary aesthetic and
artistic criteria apply.
Therefore, the perception today is that we may no longer
speak of the aesthetic experience of art but of an overlapping
aesthetic and artistic experience, with the “artistic” being
essentially linked to “political, moral, and ethical judgments
[that] have come to fill the vacuum of aesthetic judgment in a
way that was unthinkable forty years ago.”[2]
2. Artification
Let me turn to artification.  If I understand the term correctly,
‘artification’ covers the broad terrain of artifacts, events, and
processes that are initially not regarded as art but may
acquire such designation, to a greater or smaller degree, at a
later time by appropriating or acquiring some art-like
features.  This, I hope, at least partly sums up Ossi
Naukkarinen’s and Yuriko Saito’s description of the term in the
introduction to this volume.  They write:  “The neologism
refers to situations and processes in which something that is
not regarded as art in the traditional sense of the word is
changed into something art-like or into something that takes
influences from artistic ways of thinking and practicing.”[3]  
This programmatic description raises three interrelated issues:
(a) The first (to which I will return in the third part of this
essay) concerns “art in the traditional sense.”  In my view, this
is essentially or primarily art that can be recognized as such,
that is, representational art.  This may mean that the term
does not include art that is non-representational, and most
certainly not art that is art only in its “becoming,” in the sense
that it is attempting to broaden the existing agreement and
understanding of what counts as art.  Here I am referring to
art that is still attempting to be recognized as art in the
institutional sense.  It seems that the phrase “art in the
traditional sense” intends to limit art primarily to institutional
art so as to avoid situations where just about anything could
be regarded as art.  
My dissenting opinion would be that what is interesting in art
is precisely the “excess” of art in its becoming art, in contrast
with art that is already art and has been assimilated into the
institution called “art.”  This idea is also the dominant position
of any avant-garde art, be it that of the classical avant-gardes
or neo-avant-gardes, with the theory of the avant-garde of
Peter Bürger in his Theorie der Avantgarde (1974), along with
that of Jean-François Lyotard.  These represent perhaps the
most obvious instances of philosophical theory highlighting the
nature of such “becoming” and the transformation of non-art
into art.  This tradition, or project, emerged first with
anarchism and then continued in the avant-garde activities of
the twentieth century. Accordingly, a “theorist of anarchism
understands art as an experience. . . . He struggles for a
spontaneous ‘art en situation’ that depends on the moment
and place (Proudhon).”[4]
An important strand of the philosophy of art during the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries thus interprets art as
authentically art only as long as it is still striving to attain the
status of art, thus paradoxically losing its nature of authentic
art once it is relegated into the cultural archive called the
museum and art history.  Or in anarchist terms and later
avant-garde ones, “The artistic act is more important than the
work itself.”[5]
(b) Contemporary art is most frequently not concerned with
the intentions of the artist.  A work, just like any commodity,
acquires its own life and intent, which is why the import of a
work is on the side of consumption and not
creation/production.  If some of the crucial questions of art
fifty years ago were, “What does the work mean?” and “What
did the artist/author with his/her work intend to say?,” then
after the death of the artist or author and the deconstruction
of his or her status as a Cartesian subject, such issues seem to
have become redundant, also due to numerous other
poststructuralist and postmodern claims.  It is now as if the
work itself speaks.  If this was not the predominant case
today, then the issue of artification would be best qualified as
an issue about creation/production as approached and
(re)solved by various theories of creativity linked to
anthropological Marxism, on the one hand, and to the tradition
of la poïétique as developed half a century ago by the French
theorist and artist René Passeron, on the other.
We find ourselves now in the middle of the second issue that
emerges from the description of artification as related to the
“influences from artistic ways of thinking and practicing.”  In
the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, creation was
essentially represented by art and thus was opposed to
repetitive and non-creative manual work associated with the
industrial epoch.  Today we no longer regard art as an
exclusive or paramount form of creativity; with the
development of the post-industrial society and its
individualized forms of work, the issue of creativity has, at
least for the time being, lost much of its relevance.  This, of
course, does not relate to “art in the traditional sense of the
word,” which retains its nature and, it has to be underlined,
import for society.  I want to note here the important but
often insufficiently known successful efforts and practices in
Finland to integrate art into education and art education into a
general project of human well-being.
The presupposition emerging from the programmatic
description of artification described above is that “artistic ways
of thinking and practicing” are somehow different from the
non-artistic ones.  Such a statement would be true if we did
not proceed from a general notion of creativity, wherein artistic
creativity would be but a specific form of creativity, which also
encompasses everyday activities and all those that can, with
some measure of evidence, be called creative.  Probably the
greatest commodification of creative practices emerged in the
United Kingdom in the 1980s with “creative industries.”
If we were to use the notion of creativity and creativeness as
something typical of art and of describing “artistic ways of
thinking and practicing,” then this would facilitate the
integration of art into a general theory or philosophy of
creativity.  We would then be able to regard art as the
paramount instance of creativity, with its other forms being
seen as its lesser instances.  Of course, such a viewpoint
primarily concerns an artwork regarded from the position of its
author.  But does it really?  Is this not a case of “art in a
traditional sense of the word,” for it requires the link between
the artist, the artwork, and the audience (the public)?  This
viewpoint depends on the supposition that “creative” art is art
that is appreciated by the public.  It is a position that, at first
sight, is very distant from contemporary art and its art worlds,
although also presupposed by them, and accords with the
positions and practices of modern art during the first half of
the twentieth century when it was the dominant artistic form.
(c) There is also the reverse side of the issue of artification: 
“Something that is not regarded as art in the traditional sense
of the word [and] is changed into something art-like” can also
appear under other kinds of conditions and circumstances. 
Consider the tradition of British “Arts and Crafts” started by
workshops initiated by William Morris in the middle of
nineteenth century and which advocated reverting back to
medieval craftsmanship.  Think, too, of the later Jugendstil
(Art Nouveau, Liberty Style), which followed a similar
utilitarian aesthetic tradition, or of the introduction in
Germany, at the turn of the century, of innumerable
workshops that followed in the steps of that tradition in Great
Britain. (British success was so astounding that in 1896 “the
Prussian government sent the “cultural spy” Hermann
Muthesius to England on a six-year mission to study the
secrets of British success.  Upon his recommendation,
workshops were introduced at all Prussian handicraft schools
and modern artists appointed as teachers.”[6])  The aim of
such activities was the “cooperation of art, industry, and crafts
in the ennoblement of commercial activity.”[7]  It was also
from this tradition that the Bauhaus arose.  Related cases of
art willingly accepting a utilitarian function are those of
Russian constructivism[8] and, to some extent and in a
different way, of Italian Futurism.
3. Rancière’s “aesthetic regime of art”
Jacques Rancière’s notion of the aesthetic regime of art is of
interest here.  The dominant schema, explained in his
numerous works, is that a new “regime” of art, namely the
“aesthetic” one, emerged with romanticism and Friedrich
Schiller, although sometimes he mentions authors who predate
romanticism, like Vico or Winckelmann.  Rancière argues that
this regime of art is still continuing, thereby supplanting both
modernism and postmodernism, since both are purportedly
theoretically insufficient.  In his view, modernism is
problematic, first, because it lumps together such disparate
authors and works as Adorno and Futurism, and second,
because it “wants to hold onto art’s autonomy but refuses to
accept the heteronomy that is its other name.”[9]  He finds
postmodernism problematic because it purportedly only
reverses the logic of modernism, offering (through Lyotard,
one of the main adversaries of Rancière) the sublime and the
unpresentable as the two main features of
postmodernism.[10]
Instead of notions of modernism and postmodernism, Rancière
introduces the notion of an “aesthetic regime of art.”  Its
purpose is to replace both modernism and postmodernism,
which Rancière considers obsolete and erroneous terms.  In
his opinion, “The aesthetic regime of the arts, it can be said, is
the true name for what is designated by the incoherent label
‘modernity’.”[11]  In the aesthetic regime, the criterion of art
is no longer technical perfection, as in the representative
regime, “but is ascribed to a specific form of sensory
apprehension.”[12]  Furthermore, the aesthetic regime of art
resembles Fredric Jameson’s “cultural dominant,” for although
it is purportedly the dominant regime in the last two centuries,
it is admittedly not the only one to exist in this epoch, for it is
supplemented and often in conflict with the previous two
regimes, the “ethical regime of images,” and especially the
“representative regime of art” which immediately precedes the
aesthetic regime.  What is also typical of the aesthetic regime
of art is that it is “the regime that strictly identifies art in the
singular and frees it from any specific rule, from any hierarchy
of the art, subject-matter and genres.”[13]
As we can see, Rancière’s agenda is to offer his “regimes” as a
novel taxonomy that is intended to supersede the present
dominant one of the tandem modernism and postmodernism,
something that is without doubt an ambitious project. 
Rancière’s open-endedness of the aesthetic regime primarily
implies the obsolescence of the “end of art” theories.  In this it
somewhat resembles Friedrich von Schlegel’s revolutionary
attempt to bring into competitive proximity two art formations
of his own time, namely classicism and romanticism, with the
latter seen as a continuing process.  Romantic art was to
strive towards ever higher accomplishments, a view at odds
with the recent and dominant viewpoints on the decline or
even end of art, such as those of Hegel, Heidegger, and
especially Arthur Danto.  Rancière’s non-Hegelian view allows
for no temporal closures of various regimes and for no
totalizations.
One of Rancière’s points of departure is Aristotle, with his
claim that man is “political because he possesses speech, a
capacity to place the just and the unjust in common, whereas
all the animal has is a voice to signal pleasure and pain.  But
the whole question, then, is to know who possesses speech
and who merely possesses voice.”[14]  This is the point where
politics is brought into Rancière’s philosophy.  Democracy is
the possibility and the practice of making oneself heard.  By
making ourselves heard we become political beings:  “Politics
consists in reconfiguring the distribution of the sensible which
defines the common of a community, to introduce into it new
subjects and objects, to render visible what had not been, and
to make heard as speakers those who had been perceived as
mere noisy animals.”[15]  The distribution and redistribution
of the sensible are also accomplished by art.  In the realm of
art similar mechanisms as those used in politics are at work,
for they are “two forms of distribution of the sensible, both of
which are dependent on a specific regime of identification. 
There are not always occurrences of politics, although there
always exist forms of power.  Similarly, there are not always
occurrences of art, although there are always forms of poetry,
painting, sculpture, music, theatre and dance.”[16]
Throughout Rancière’s oeuvre, Friedrich Schiller is singled out
as one of the pivotal references for his political philosophy and
aesthetics.  It is the concept of “play” or play drive (Spieltrieb)
that is especially important here, for it brings together “art of
the beautiful” and “art of living.”  In Schiller’s view, which
developed also as a critique of the French Revolution, play is
of special importance.  As he explains toward the end of the
fifteenth letter in his On the Aesthetic Education of Man, “Man
plays only when he is in the full sense of the word a man, and
he is only wholly Man when he is playing.”[17]  According to
Rancière, play “is any activity that has no end other than
itself, that does not intend to gain any effective power over
things or persons.”[18]  “Play” is a new form of distribution of
the sensible, an activity with no purpose except itself and with
no intent to exert power over others.  An artwork is “given in a
specific experience, which suspends the ordinary connections,
not only between appearance and reality, but also between
form and matter, activity and passivity, understanding and
sensibility.”[19]
It is not my intention to discuss Rancière’s philosophy and its
various themes in detail.  I have touched on only a few issues
that could be relevant to our topic.  Let me end this part by
observing that, in Rancière’s view, artistic autonomy and
heteronomy are always intertwined, with the aesthetic
experience being autonomous and the creation of art
heteronomous.  In a way, Rancière’s theory, like that of some
of the Romantics, echoes the ancient Greek conflation of art
and community, that is, the organic consubstantionality of art
and the life of the polis.
4. “Art become life”
In an exhibition in the spring of 2011, in the entrance hall of
the Research Center in Ljubljana, where I work, one of the
works consisted of a canvas over which the statement “Public
Art is for the Birds” was written in big letters.  The sentence,
of course, brings to mind the artist Barnett Newman who, in a
statement made famous, exclaimed that “Aesthetics is to the
artist as ornithology is to the birds.”  Since its enunciation
around 1952, this claim has been reiterated on innumerable
occasions.  Its original addressee was Susan Langer, and its
intent was to denigrate attempts to introduce semiotics and
linguistics into art criticism and aesthetics.  It was also often
interpreted as criticism of the beautiful on the part of Newman
and his embracing of the sublime, although its most frequent
interpretation was that of a criticism of aesthetics as such.  Be
that as it may, for Newman aesthetics obviously was not
relevant for art and did not aid in establishing its significance. 
This, of course, drastically changed in the decades that
followed, for today authentic art appears essentially dependent
on theory.
But in the 1950s this was not the case, nor is “public” art
usually considered “authentic art” today.  Instead, in the eyes
of some or perhaps many, public art is nowadays often
regarded as a type of art, if not “semi-art.”  Proper or
authentic contemporary art is assumed to be that which is
radical, in the sense of subversive and critical of society or of
previous art.  In both instances, it is the modern and
modernist tradition that questions public art and continues to
do so, in spite of many well-known instances of modern and
postmodern public art, such as that of Henry Moore, Richard
Serra, and Anish Kapoor.
If our vantage point is radical art, then, in our opinion, public
art today may well be left to the birds and their multifarious
activities on pieces of public art.  In the eyes of the creator of
the work exhibited in Ljubljana, public art may best be left to
the birds, for it is not an authentic form of art that would be of
genuine artistic concern.  From this perspective, public art
today may thus very well be seen as a form of artification,
that is, an integration of mostly site-specific works into natural
or urban ambiances.  This was always a feature of public art,
but today it is also such art that appears somewhat
inauthentic.  And this is the essential problem with artification,
that people may regard it as inauthentic, especially if it is
interpreted as something “art-like.”  In the Western tradition,
kitsch is something that pretends to be art-like; it aspires to
be art-like, but that is as far as it gets.  It is fake art.  As soon
as it crosses the border into the realm of authentic art, leaving
fake and kitsch behind, art re/distributes the sensible.  It
offers something new:  it “speaks” instead of being mute and
without a voice.
By gaining a voice and starting to speak and express oneself,
an authentic artist effects a redistribution of the sensible and
broadens the borders of what is perceived and sensed.  It is a
new “voice” to be heard or seen, in short, experienced, which
is another way of designating the mechanism whereby a
person becomes an artist and the work an artwork.
Of course, art that is happy with its subordination to another
purpose or agency cannot attain its proper purpose, which is
one of the reasons why artification encounters difficulties when
grappling with art’s assimilation.  Only by “playing,” by having
a purpose without a purpose, is a man “wholly man.” We may
assume that such “play” and its creations are appreciated by
the artist as well as by the public, although the relationship is
by no means a stable and a predetermined one.
There are numerous cases when a work causes great
satisfaction, in the sense of “play,” to the artist but very little
to the public. Amateur works are frequently of such nature. 
There is also the opposite situation, such as when an
acclaimed artist makes a simple sketch, which  for him is mere
amusement, while for the public at large it represents a little
masterpiece.  Which is it?  On the other hand, in modern art
there are innumerable cases of art that was art for the artist
as well as for the public.  This is even more the case in
representational art.  There, the “quality” and artistic value are
relatively easily defined.  As we see, art is given various kinds
of reception, and especially today our “imaginary museum” is
filled with very disparate objects and phenomena.
Nonetheless, a salient feature of modern art is not only its
variety but its semantic openness and its faith that it is the
public that should accommodate the work of art and not the
other way around.
Why is it necessary for art to be accommodated by the public?
  Because (and in this we can follow Adorno) authentic art and
culture require effort to overcome the resistance made to it.
“Culture, in the true sense, did not simply accommodate itself
to human beings; but it always simultaneously raised protest
against the petrified relations under which they lived, thereby
honoring them. ...Cultural entities typical of the culture
industry are no longer also commodities, they are commodities
through and through.”[20]  Interestingly, in instances where
art attempts to imitate creations made according to the
demands of the public, such fake art remains authentic art,
just the opposite of kitsch. Take, for example, the project of
Komar & Melamid’s “Most Wanted,” where the two artists
created a series of paintings based on a survey of public
preferences of the motifs, formats, and colors of individual
paintings.[21]  In spite of formally following the procedures of
the market, the works actually functioned as any other
authentic works of art.  This illustrates that while artification
as a transformation of art into non-art, or of non-art into
“something art-like,” may well work as an abstraction, it
depends, in fact, on a variety of other factors.
Still, it appears that there are  times when non-art may turn
into art and the other way around, without endangering the
artistic and aesthetic status of art, but the contrary.  I refer to
examples  of what Rancière calls the project of “art become
life.”[22]  The project is consubstantial with the aesthetic
regime of art.  It already inspired, in their dreams of artisanal
and communitarian Middle Ages, the artists of the Arts and
Crafts movement.  It was taken up again by the artisans of the
Art Deco movement, hailed in their time as producers of
“social art,” as it was by the engineers and architects of the
Werkbund and the Bauhaus, before again flowering into the
utopian projects of situationist urbanists and Joseph Beuys’
“social plastic.”[23]
Although artification is said to concern “art in the traditional
sense,” it would appear that while some of the movements
mentioned above produced works of craftsmanship and thus
probably belong to that gray area between the realms of
utilitarian production and its aesthetic features, there is no
obvious contradiction between the two.  In these instances,
utilitarian and aesthetic functions and features are conflated
seamlessly, even opposing and thus relativizing the old
aesthetic belief that a utilitarian object must lose its practical
function if it is to attain an aesthetic one.  Art Deco or
Bauhaus chairs, lamps, architecture, and cutlery are practical
and aesthetic; they are non-art (having a practical function)
merging with art (having an aesthetic function).  Instances of
such utilitarian aesthetic works can also be found in Russian
constructivism and productivism; in Italian Futurism, with
objects ranging from the “anti-neutral clothes” of Giacomo
Balla to the architectural sketches of Antonio Sant’Elia; in the
“paper architecture” of Lajos Kassák and the more recent
“architecture of nothing” by Gábor Bachman; and in the coffee
cups, passports, and armbands of the Slovenian artist
collective Neue Slowenische Kunst.
In brief, the conflation of art and non-art, or the passage of
non-art into utilitarian aesthetic and artistic objects, occurs all
the time and, as the cases just mentioned illustrate, it is
definitely not limited to art in the traditional sense but is as
often created by avant-garde artists.  In such a context, the
issue of subordination of art doesn’t arise; form usually follows
function.  It is this terrain that could also be relevant to
artification.        
Before the advent of the aesthetic regime of art, that is, the
period of artistic modernity and postmodernity, Mimesis
separated out what was art from what was not.  Conversely,
all the new, aesthetic definitions of art that affirm its
autonomy in one way or another say the same thing, affirm
the same paradox:  that art is henceforth recognizable by its
lack of any distinguishing characteristics—by its indistinction. .
. . In short, the specificity of art, finally nameable as such, is
its identity with non-art.[24]
It is this problematic statement that serves as the conclusion
of this essay because it reveals the limits of Rancière’s
otherwise useful and important enterprise.  Theories of
modernism and postmodernism point out certain essential
characteristics of the art of the last two centuries, a task as
yet not accomplished by the “aesthetic regime of art” that
lumps together art of impressionism with abstract art and
Duchamp’s projects.  Put differently, the art it highlights and
comprises is even more disparate than Adorno and Futurism. 
My reservations are directed also towards some of the other
tenets of Rancière’s theory, for the aesthetic regime of art is
an interrelated notion within his philosophical framework. 
Nonetheless, I think that this criticism does not weaken the
argument that the project of “art become life” remains valid,
both in Rancière and elsewhere, when referring to artification
and utilitarian creations of certain traditions and endeavors, in
addition to aesthetic avant-garde movements and their related
radical projects.
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